Norms play essential roles in regulating aspects of social behavior in groups. Viewed as quasi-formal rules that can "instruct strangers and convey to children" how to behave in specific situations from a particular groups' perspective -norms are models of (situationally) correct behaviors that ostensibly afford some benefit to the referent group (Brown, 1995) and are found in virtually all human societies (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989) . Norms, as opposed to laws, are often unwritten and generally do not emerge through an explicit democratic or other formal governing mechanisms.
Our interpretation of routines-as-norms is in line with what are often called social norms
reflecting their socially-situated (and socially-shared) definition and level of informality, differentiating them from legal and moral norms, or habits and fads (Brown, 1995; Elster, 1989; Hechter & Opp, 2001; Tuomela, 1995) . In addition to their relative institutional informality, universal acceptance, and (presumed) benefit to the group, another property of social norms is that their violation will bring extra-legal sanctions; that is, violation of a norm is likely to engage some sort of punishment from the referent group, directly or indirectly (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dalton, 1948; Hackman, 1992; Wendel, 2001; Whyte, 1955) . Thus, the components of acceptable behavior within the group are largely defined and enforced by intra-group processes, and it is presumed that sanctions, in whatever form invoked, have an impact on the decision to deviate from a norm. A norm is not a norm unless there is some sanction for its violation (Coleman, 1990, Ch. 11; Gibbs, 1966; Horne, 2001) 3 . However, informal sanctioning involves a decision to enforce a norm at a cost. How then can an optional, costly behavior successfully spread in a population? One solution is structural: impose a second layer norm over the first, a metanorm (Axelrod, 1986 ; Prietula and Conway, in press).
Our routines as norms assertion suggests some possible links with extant work by Arie
Lewin on metaroutines -routines that change the parameters of other routines (Lewin, Massini & Peters, 2008; Lewin & Volberda, 2003; Massini, Lewin & Greve, 2005) . If an informal but important behavior serves a distinctly advantageous role in the value of the institution relative to others, then the emergence and adaptations of the behavior to the institution may be viewed as a co-evolutionary process linked to institutional performance over a sufficient period of time (Lewin, Long & Carroll, 1999; McKelvey, 1997) . Our work generates a simulation model of a co-evolutionary form of meta-routines enforcing a norm of cooperation via a meta-routine of enforcement against deception (Axelrod, 1984) , but raises the level of selection to the group rather than individuals, in order to discern competitive solutions (Boyd & Richarson, 2002) . That is, we are applying concepts of cultural evolution to institutional forms (Henrich & Boyd, 1998) in a computational model. As Gurek, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) have demonstrated, people prefer institutional arrangements where norm violators (in this case, over-consumers of common pool resources) are punished over institutions where they are not. However, the form and nature of altruistic (costly) punishment is largely cultural in nature, thus flexible and contextually variant , with the cultural component itself likely emerging from evolutionary processes (de Waal, 2009; Henrich & Henrich, 2006; Simon, 1990) . Thus, meta-routines are seen as a possible solution to the costly punishment paradox in order to generate institutions that can successfully evolve in a competitive environment. For our poster session, we will report on the results of this work.
